underlies the Pharisees' views on the Shabbat, the obligations to a neighbor and other issues will be especially eye-opening to those who know the Pharisees simply as mlc·obsessed foils for Jesus' teachings in the ew Testament.
As with any sharp dicbotomy, one can quibble witb this one. To give the most obvious historical counterexample to Professor Saiman's contrast between rabbinic attention to legal detail and Christian flexibility, the Catholic canon law seems (as Professor Sairnan notes) to reflect the careful accretion of precedents he associates with rabbinic reasoning. But the overall point is both subtle and compelling: Jesus and the Pharisees engaged in very different modes of legal interpretation.
Attending to these differences offers a multitude of insights into the New Testament, the Mosaic law and contemporary American law.
The brief discussion that follows will raise, and worry the bone of. In other passages, such as Jesus' Sermon on the Mount teachings that a person who lusts has committed adultery and a man who is angry at his brother is a murderer, the emphasis on God's law seems even more clear.
Because human regulators and law enforcers, unlike God. cannot look into OLlf hearts to discern ollr anger or lust, ordinary men and women could never systematically enforce these principles 9
If these observations are more or less on the mark, they suggest that one could plausibly embrace both Jesus' call to interpret the law of God expansively and flexibly, on the one hand, and a narrow approach to Constitutional and statutory interpretation, on the otheL lO From this perspective, evangelicals' enthusiasm for strict construction is not as paradoxical as it seems at first. To fully develop tbe argument, one might also want to incorporate a theory or theories of judicial review.
One obvious candidate is the familiar concern that judges are less accountable to the populace than legislators, and should therefore bc encouraged to cllrb any enthusiasm for expansive interpretation.
Having outlined a possible justification for evangelicals' insistence on originalism and textualisl11, I should also note that the stridency of this insistence seems to me to reflect other factors as well. 1 sllspect, for instance, the resonance within the evangelical community of compJaints about the refusal of "unelected judges" to be bound by the statutory text also owes something to the tradition or Biblical literalism in Anlerican God's law, human law must play the double game of restraining the worst sins of the citizelUY without giving law enforcers so much discretion that they are invited to sin themselves.
I I
I would be curious to know how these questions of scope would play out under a rabbinic approach to law-making. J suspect that the reasoning process would differ from that of a Ch,istian legal scholar in much the same way as it does in the judicial context. This suggests another i rony in contemporary American evangelicalism-fhe tendency to assume that legislation can and should be used tp solve most social problems, despite JeSus' suggestion, as Professor Saiman puts it. that "law is an ill-suited medium through which to stnJcture social relationships." (p. 100). where this analysis leads-or has led, to the extent that rabbinically trained scholars bave wrestled with these issues in the past.
As these comments refiect, Jesus' Le g al TheOlY has the same qualities as the velY finest perf0l111anCeS in other contexts: not only will it cause both Christian and Jewish readers to think more carefully about their own religious traditions; not only will it give them new insights into a different tradition, and give other readers rich new insights into both traditions and their influence on American law; but the article leaves this reader. as I suspect it will many others, anxious for more.
12, For a survey of this literature and the debate II has spawned, see Mark A. Sargem,
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